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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Priority No. 2 
v. : 
JEFFERY SCOTT WORTHINGTON, : Case No. 970668-CA 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
In addition to the facts and arguments contained in the State/Appellant's opening 
brief, the State submits the following points in reply to the statements and arguments 
contained in defendant/appellee's responsive brief. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION IN POINT 1(A), THAT 
DEPUTY SORENSON'S PRESENCE INSIDE THE HOME WAS 
NON-CONSENSUAL AND COERCIVE 
In Point 1(A) of his brief, defendant disputes that Deputy Sorenson lawfully 
entered his home to ask him questions about the drugs found at his workplace, on the 
ground that he did not personally invite in the deputy. Appellee's Brief (Aple. Br.) at 9. 
Significantly, defendant does not dispute the trial court's findings that his wife invited the 
deputy into their home to speak with him (R. 58-59), Appellant's Brief (ApIt. Br.), 
Addendum B (Add. B), nor does he contend that his wife lacked authority to do so. Aple. 
1 
Br. at 9. Cf. State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Utah App. 1991) (recognizing as "well 
established," the precept that a third person may consent to a search of another's property 
if the third person has "common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the 
premises or effects sought to be inspected."). 
Moreover, as set forth in the State's opening brief, the deputy's consensual entry 
and subsequent brief investigatory questioning in defendant's front room did not manifest 
an air of police dominance or compulsion which would convert an otherwise voluntary 
encounter into custodial interrogation. See Aplt. Br. at 10-13. Defendant's claims that 
the deputy's conduct was coercive, and that the deputy had a subjective and compulsive 
strategy are unsupported by record citation. See Aple. Br. at 9-10. See also Rule 
24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (requiring appellee to provide citation to 
"authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on"). Utah appellate courts decline to 
consider arguments that are not adequately grounded in the record and supported by 
meaningful analysis. See, e.g., State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); State 
v. Farrow, 919 P.2d 50, 53 n.l (Utah App. 1996); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248-50 
(Utah App. 1992). 
Finally, the available record is devoid of indication, and the trial court entered no 
findings to the effect, that the deputy's behavior was threatening or coercive (see R. 57-
59), Aplt. Br. Add. B. Deputy Sorenson's questioning was brief and investigatory in 
nature: whether defendant recognized the box, or had any information regarding the 
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inscription therein or its contents. See Aplt. Br. at 3-5. The questioning did not amount 
to a direct accusation of guilt as in State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996), nor did it 
take place following an uninvited, pre-dawn, bedroom encounter as in Orozco v. Texas, 
394 U.S. 324 (1969). Defendant's reliance on these cases as factually similar is therefore 
questionable. See Aple. Br. at 9. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION IN POINT 1(B), THAT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE DEPUTY'S 
PURPORTED SUBJECTIVE FOCUS 
With no supporting authority, defendant boldly asserts that Many objectively 
reasonable person in [defendant's] circumstances would have been well aware of [the 
deputy's] focusing the investigation on [him], whether [the deputy] explicitly announced 
his beliefs or not. Aple. Br. at 11 (emphasis added). This is so, claims defendant, based 
solely on the deputy's alleged coercive conduct in stating that he would name the items in 
the box for defendant to determine whether he recognized the items, which statement 
defendant claims was asked in the presence of his wife and son. Aple. Br. at 13. 
First, defendant's broad assertion of the legal standard is contrary to controlling 
authority making clear that an officer's subjective focus is irrelevant to the custody 
determination, unless the suspect is made aware of the purported focus. See Aplt. Br. at 
14-17 (and cases cited therein). Here, the record is devoid of indication that defendant 
was aware of the deputy's purported subjective focus: moreover, the trial court entered no 
findings to that effect (R. 58-59), Aplt. Br. Add. B. Defendant does not claim that he 
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overheard the deputy's purported remark to his wife, that he (defendant) was the primary 
suspect. See Aplt. Br. 16-17 & n.4. 
Second, as explained in the State's opening brief, defendant was certainly the 
starting point of the deputy's investigation; however, this type of investigatory focus does 
not trigger Miranda protections. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 356-47 
(1976) (distinguishing between "focus" in the "starting point of an investigation" and 
"focus" for Miranda purposes, which occurs only when questioning is initiated by police 
after a suspect has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom). See Aplt. 
Br. at 14-17 (and cases cited therein). 
Third, as noted previously, defendant's claims of coercive behavior on the part of 
the deputy are unsupported in the record. It is true that defendant's wife and child were 
nearby during the questioning (R. 93, 110). Contrary to defendant's assertion; however, 
their presence mitigates against defendant's claims of police coercion. See Aplt. Br. at 
12-13 (and cases cited therein). Defendant cites no contrary authority. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS IN POINTS I(C)-(E) 
THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES WERE COERCIVE, DESPITE THE 
ABSENCE OF ANY OBJECTIVE INDICIA OF ARREST, THE 
BREVITY OF THE QUESTIONING, AND THE FACT THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT REMOVED FROM HIS HOME FOR 
QUESTIONING 
Defendant concedes that no objective indicia of arrest were present during the 
deputy's questioning. Aple. Br. at 12-13. He further admits that the questioning was 
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brief. Aple. Br. at 13. Finally, defendant acknowledges that he was not physically 
removed to another location. Id However, defendant nonetheless asserts that the 
deputy's questioning was coercive 1) because he did not personally consent to the 
deputy's entry; 2) he had just awakened; 3) his wife and son were present; and 4) the 
alleged tenor of the questioning was incriminating. Id. 
Defendant's allegations regarding the consensual nature of the deputy's entry are 
refuted in the State's Response to Point 1(A), infra, and his allegations regarding the 
effect of the presence of his wife and son are refuted in the State's response to Point 1(B), 
infra. As explained there, and in the State's opening brief, at pp. 10-14, neither factor 
contributes favorably to defendant's claims of coercion. 
The fact that defendant had just awakened similarly fails to demonstrate 
coerciveness on the part of the deputy. See Aplt. Br. at 17-18 (and cases cited therein). 
As set out in the State's opening brief, the pertinent inquiry is whether defendant was 
taken to the place of interrogation by police against his will. State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 
292, 297 (Utah App. 1990) (recognizing significance of fact that "while [Morrell] had not 
come to the place of questioning voluntarily, he had also not been taken there by police 
against his will"). It makes no difference whether the legal inquiry is phrased as above, 
or as defendant prefers: "'whether the defendant came to the place of interrogation freely 
and willingly.'" Aple. Br. at 14 n.3 (quoting State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1335 (Utah 
App. 1993) (quoting Morrell, 803 P.2d at 297), cert denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993)). 
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Neither Morrell nor Gray requires, or even hints at, the metaphysical consideration of the 
defendant's consciousness which the trial court engaged in here. 
Finally, while the deputy's minimal questioning generated an incriminating 
response, his questioning can not alone transform the situation into a custodial one 
requiring Miranda warnings. See Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147 (recognizing that 
"accusatory-type questioning" is not alone dispositive of custody issue). Defendant 
wholly fails to explain what about the deputy's questioning was remotely coercive. Aple. 
Br. at 13. His unanalyzed assertion should be rejected on that ground. See Rule 24(a)(9); 
Amicone, 689 P.2d at 1344; Farrow, 919 P.2d at 53. n.l; Price, 827 P.2d at 248-50. 
As noted previously, the record is devoid of indication that the deputy's demeanor 
or surrounding circumstances created an atmosphere from which a reasonable person 
would have felt that his freedom of action was curtailed to a degree associated with 
formal arrest. To the contrary, the deputy was invited into the defendant's home by 
defendant's wife, who along with their son, remained nearby throughout the questioning. 
Moreover, the questioning was brief and no indicia of arrest were present. These factors 
militate against the trial court's conclusion of a custodial interrogation. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S CLAIM IN POINT II THAT THIS 
COURT MAY AFFIRM THE RULING BELOW ON ALTERNATIVE 
GROUNDS 
Defendant asks this Court to affirm the trial court's ruling on the alternative 
ground that the circumstances of the deputy's questioning were unconstitutionally 
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coercive. Aple. Br. at 14-16. 
Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is 
not "voluntary" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). "Absent any allegation of 
police misconduct that is causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for 
concluding that the any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of 
law." Id. at 164. Accord State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303, 1310 (Utah App. 1991) 
(recognizing that "the sole concern underlying the Fifth Amendment is coercive tactics by 
government agents"). "Indeed, far from being prohibited by the Constitution, admission 
of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently desirable." State v. Piansiaksone, 
337 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 11 (Utah Feb. 13, 1998) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 
305(1985). 
Here, defendant points to his 11th grade educational level, his limited prior 
experience with law enforcement, his "unspecified learning disability," and his sleepiness 
at the time of the questioning, and claims that as a result of these factors, the deputy's 
questioning was rendered coercive. Aple. Br. at 15. Under Connelly, however, these 
factors do not by themselves render an otherwise ordinary interview coercive. 479 U.S. 
at 164 (holding that a defendant's mental condition, by itself and apart from its relation to 
official coercion, does not render confession involuntary). See also Singer, 815 P.2d at 
1309 n.9 (recognizing that Connelly rejected the "overborne will" analysis for analyzing 
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the voluntariness of a confession). Defendant wholly fails to explain that the deputy was 
aware of, or exploited these alleged weaknesses. Specifically, defendant does not assert 
that he was unable to understand or communicate with Deputy Sorenson, or that the 
questioning continued over his objection. See Aple. Br. at 15. While defendant was 
apparently sleepy, he had had some sleep prior to the questioning, and also inculpated 
himself early in the interview, reducing the possibility that sleep deprivation caused the 
confession (R. 92, 110). See Piansiaksone, ?>2>1 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12 (noting fact that 
defendant inculpated himself early in the 5:38 a.m. interview reduced the possibility that 
sleep deprivation caused the confession). 
The only alleged causally coercive conduct on the part of the deputy that defendant 
identifies is the deputy's alleged "domineering" and "aggressive" questioning, and his 
alleged "threat" to reveal the contents of the drug box to defendant's family. Aple. Br. at 
15-16. As noted previously, defendant's claims of coercion are based solely on his 
unsupported interpretation of the record. See Aple. Br. at 16. This is a sufficient ground 
in itself upon which to reject defendant's argument. See Rule 24(a)(9); Amicone, 689 
P.2d at 1344; Farrow, 919 P.2d at 53. n.l; Price, 827 P.2d at 248-50. Considering the 
totality of the circumstances, defendant's assertion of unconstitutional coercion should be 
rejected. Singer, 815 P.2d at 1309 (totality of circumstances review applies to 
voluntariness of a confession). 
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CONCLUSION 
For reasons set forth here, and the Appellant's opening brief, the trial court's 
ruling that the home interview constituted custodial interrogation requiring Miranda 
warnings, exceeds legal boundaries and therefore merits no discretion. It should be 
overturned. 
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